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Theorizing about o rgan iza t iona l  behavior  is 
r e p l e t e  wi th  concepts  t h a t ,  i m p l i c i t l y  and e x p l i c i t l y ,  
a t t r i b u t e  g r e a t  v i r t u e  t o  c l a r i t y  i n  p r e s c r i b i n g  t h e  
a c t i o n s  of i n d i v i d u a l  organiza t ion  members. 
f i c i t y  of t a s k  assignment, p r e c i s e  knowledge of l i n e s  
of  a u t h o r i t y ,  d i s c i p l i n e ,  bureaucracy, con t ro l ,  - these  
and many o t h e r  concepts rest on t h e  no t ion  t h a t  
ambiguity is t o  be regarded as a f l y  i n  t h e  ointment 
Speci-  
of o rgan iza t iona l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Nor is t h i s  a n t i -  
ambiguity l e i t m o t i f  confined e n t i r e l y  t o  t h e  more 
t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e o r i e s  ; views t h a t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
o b j e c t i v e s  should be communicated a s  c l e a r l y  as 
p o s s i b l e  and t h a t  people "should know where they 
stand",  have wide  currency. 
- 
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On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  has been l i t t l e  sys t ema t i c  
focus on t h e  concept of "ambiguity" i n  o rgan iza t iona l  
theory  (wi tness ,  f o r  ins tance  i t s  r a r e  appearance i n  
indexes of t h e  r e l evan t  t e x t s  - 1  ( l )  
p o s i t i v e  a spec t s  of ambiguity,  no tab ly  i t s  func t ion  i n  
cushioning i x g a n i t a t i o n a l  stress, has  been t r e a t e d  only 
s p o r a d i c a l l y .  
Espec ia l ly ,  t h e  
This paper proposes t h a t  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
c l a r i t y -ambigu i ty  on one hand, and Organiza t iona l  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  on the  o the r  is  n e c e s s a r i l y  complex, and 
t h a t  it becomes appropr ia te  t o  develop a set of prop- 
o s i t i o n s  s p e c i f y i n g  when ambiguity may be f r i e n d ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  assuming uniformly t h a t  i t  i s  foe.  
Diagram I sugges ts  t h e  genera l  shape of t h e  func t ion  
r e l a t i n g  ambiguity to organ iza t iona l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  under 
some hypo the t i ca l  c e t e r i s  pa r ibus  condi t ion  . Rather 
than  t h e  l i n e a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  o f t e n  i s  assumed t o  
p r e v a i l ,  t h e  func t ion  more l i k e l y  is c u r v i l i n e a r :  i f  
ambiguity is extremely low (e.g. i n  circumstances of 
(1) An important exception: P e t e r  4 .  Blau and W. Richard 
S c o t t ,  Formal Organiza t ions ,  San Francisco:  Chandler 
Publ i sh ing  Co.,  1962, espec.  p. 198 and p. 2 4 0 - 2 4 2 .  
Also, a spec t s  of the work of l e l v i l l e  Dalton and 
E l l i o t t  Jaques p e r t a i n .  
. .  
high 





n E  
. ow high 
c ‘\ B .OG 
atcbiguity 
A --------- B conventional aaenmption 
C D E F G probable curnilinear pattern 
D E F 
E optimal ambiguity point 
functional ambiguity range 
DIAGRAM I -
A GENERAL AMBIGUITY FUNCTION 
. .  3 .  
fish-bowl like c l a r i t y ) ,  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  is r e l a t i v e l y  
low (though probably not rock-bottom); i f  ambiguity is 
extremely high (e.g. when a l l  i s  a mad, wi ld  jumble of 
u n c e r t a i n t y ) ,  o rgan iza t iona l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  f a l l s  t o  
i t s  n a d i r .  But a t  some in te rmedia te  po in t  i n  ambiguity,  
o r  gani z a t  i onal  e f f ec t iveness  is  op t i m i  zed . 
The fol lowing argument is presented  i n  defense of 
t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  t o o  l i t t l e  ambiguity makes it  in-  
poss ib l e  f o r  i nd iv idua l s  and o rgan iza t iona l  subsystems 
t o  " r o l l  w i t h  t h e  punch" of changing, and o f t e n  them- 
s e l v e s  ambiguous, o rgan iza t iona l  performance r equ i r e -  
ments ; such dea r th  of  ambiguity promotes c o n f l i c t  because 
it leaves  no room f o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  opposing i n d i v i d u a l s  
o r  o rgan iza t iona l  subsys tems t o  back o f f ,  o r  t o  meet 
half-way, w i th in  a no-mans land o f  " func t iona l  ambi- 
guity". Too much ambiguity s e v e r l y  impedes organi -  
z a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  by c r e a t i n g  overwhelming anx ie ty  
f o r  t h e  ind iv idua l s  and by obscuring gu ide l ines  necessary  
f o r  o rgan iza t iona l  su rv iva l .  
extremes f a l l s  a range of ambiguity l e v e l s  t h a t ,  f o r  a 
given se t  of circumstances (such as economic c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
soc io - t echn ica l  p a t t e r n s ,  t i m e  p r e s s u r e s ,  e t c . )  i s  i n -  
deed adapt ive  as viewed from t h e  s t andpo in t  of organi -  
za t ion  and/or i nd iv idua l .  Within t h i s  range of f u n c t i o n a l  
ambiguity it may be poss ib l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  e m p i r i c a l l y  an 
optimal ambiguity p o i n t ,  as may be found t o  e x i s t  a t  a 
given t i m e .  
However, between t h e s e  two 
4 .  
Considerat ions of formal theory  a s i d e ,  ope ra t ing  
managers tend  t o  accept a f o l k l o r e  t h a t  a t t a c h e s  p o s i t i v e  
value t o  c l a r i t y  and e x p l i c i t n e s s  i n  matters p e r t a i n i n g  
t o  o rgan iza t iona l  behavior.  A t  any ra te ,  they  sense 
t h a t  the folkways requi re  p u b l i c  espousa l  of an a n t i -  
m b i g u i t y  p o s i t i o n .  Y e t ,  i n  many i n s t ances  p u b l i c  
espousa l  and p r i v a t e  b e l i e f  are anything by congruent.  
Yany a s k i l l e d  manager is an expe r t  i n  t h e  ambiguity 
- game (Diagram 1 1 ) :  he w i l l  enuncia te  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t ,  a f te r  a l l ,  important a spec t s  of  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
opera t ion  ( l i n e s  of a u t h o r i t y ,  procedures ,  p o l i c i e s ,  
e tc . )  should be c l e a r l y  s p e l l e d  o u t . . .  i f  he senses  
t h a t ,  p ragmat ica l ly ,  this w i l l  s t r eng then  h i s  p o s i t i o n .  
A t  t he  same time, he w i l l  seek t o  l eave  uns t a t ed  and 
-
s u i t a b l y  vague those  matters with r e spec t  t o  which he 
d e s i r e s  "breathing room1'. Depending on t h e  i s s u e ,  and 
as a func t ion  of var ious power and competi t ive r e l a t i o n s ,  
o t h e r  managers, a t  pee r ,  s u p e r i o r  o r  subord ina te  l e v e l s ,  
may e n t e r  i n t o  a * 'col lusivetf  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t k :  a given 
manager who engages i n  the "ambiguity game", encouragine 
a p o t e n t i a l l y  func t iona l  ambiguity s t a t e  (as def ined  by 
i n d i v i d u a l  o r  sub-organiza t iona l  o b j e c t i v e s ) ,  o r  they 
may seek t o  counter  h i s  moves, urging  c l a r i t y  where he 
seeks t h e  comforting v e i l  of vagueness. 
l O W  
ambiguity 
C D E F manager Seek8 ambiguity ("breathing room") 
(+) defined In term of perceptloxw of speci f lo  8~anager; 
organlsatlonal effeotirutems needs t o  be described 
by rreparate function. 
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J o i n t  support  for  a given ambiguity s ta te  by two 
o r  more managers i s  t h e  example p a r  exce l lence  of t h e  
use of ambiguity as a cushion aga ins t  o rgan iza t iona l  
stress. Under these  condi t ions ,  i f  ambiguity is 
maintained t o  t h e  eyes  of persons o u t s i d e ,  t h e  managers 
concerned create a si t lxat ion where one may act as a 
" f o i l t t  f o r  t h e  other, i . e .  they  maintain an e x t e r n a l  
image of  ambiguity as t o  j u s t  who was r e spons ib l e  f o r  
a p a r t i c u l a r  dec is ion .  
t h e  use of committees as a kind of "black box" device ,  
t o  obscure t o  an ' ou t s ide r '  t h e  "actual"  dec i s ion  locus .  
In connection wi th  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  o rgan iza t ion  and 
an o u t s i d e r ,  t h i s  involves a t r a d e - o f f :  how much f u r t h e r  
c o n f l i c t  w i l l  be generated by the  e x i s t e n c e  of a 
f r u s t r a t e d  o u t s i d e r  who has no recourse ,  as aga ins t  
the  quest ion:  how much o rgan iza t iona l  energy w i l l  need 
t o  3e committed t o  the  t a s k  of Working through" a 
p a r t i c u l a r  problem with s p e c i f i c  decision-makers w i t h i n  
t h e  organiza t ion .  
-
A s i m i l a r  process ope ra t e s  with 
I n  terms of i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  stress, j o i n t  
support  f o r  an ambiguity s t a t e  makes it p o s s i b l e  f o r  
the  managers involved t o  e s t a b l i s h  appropr i a t e  compro- 
mises i n  a reas  such as t a s k  d e f i n i t i o n s  and assumption 
of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I n  r e l a t i o n s  t o  s u p e r i o r s  or o t h e r s  
ou t s ide  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  o rgan iza t iona l  sub-sys tep ,  t h e  
managers may a r r i v e  a t  a r b i t r a r y  r o l e  assignments,  
along func t iona l  or other  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l i n e s ,  e .g .  
*'Joe is  i n  charge of t h e  budget end;  I take  c a r e  of 
t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s t u f f "  ...( i n  r e a l i t y ,  both may be i n -  
t i m a t e l y  involved i n  both func t ions . )  
Tile fol lowing a r e  some case  examples i l l u s t r a t i n g  
j o i n t  support  for ambiguity states t h a t  may prove 
h e l p f u l  to organ iza t iona l  func t ion ing:  
Case A: T h e  co-managing d i r e c t o r s  of a 
la rge  B r i t i s h  t e x t i l e  f i r m  
in a l a r g e  E r i t i s h  t e x t i l e  f i rm t o p  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is  lodged i n  two no t  i n  
the customary s i n g l e  managing o f f i c e r .  
By way of formal p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  i t  i s  in- 
d i c a t e d  t h a t  b o t h  men equa l ly  s h a r e  over-  
a l l  execut ive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and a u t h o r i t y .  
The i r  d i v i s i o n  of  l a b o r  is  purpos ive ly  
l e f t  ambiguous. Yhi le ,  i n  f a c t ,  c e r t a i n  
primary func t ions  a r e  u s u a l l y  performed 
by one or  t h e  o t h e r  of t h e  two men, t h e r e  
are many i n s t a n c e s  t h a t  involve a re- 
s h u f f l i n g  of  t h e  decision-making locus .  
Such 
e s p e c i a l l y  when it  is convenient  t o  do s o  
-' 
modif icat ion of procedure i s  employed 
7.  
i n  order t o  s a t i s f y  a customer o r  o t h e r  
organiza t iona l  o u t s i d e r .  Fu r the r ,  under 
changing cond i t ions ,  t h e  co-managing 
o f f i c e r s  may recognize t h a t  t h e  s k i l l s  
of one or  t h e  o t h e r  are more s u i t a b l e  
for imdertaking a particiilar admin i s t r a t ive  
t a s k .  The p e r s o n a l i t y  s t r u c t u r e s  of t h e  
co-managing d i r e c t o r s  are such t h a t  
n e i t h e r  t h r e a t e n s  the  o t h e r ,  and t h a t  
t he re  appears l i t t l e  need f o r  one o r  t h e  
o t h e r  t o  defend a p a r t i c u l a r  dec i s ion  o r  
area of a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  
Case E: The associate execut ive  d i r e c t o r s  
o f  a large s o c i a l  welfare agency. 
As another example, i n  a large s o c i a l  
wel fa re  agency, t h e  t o p  execut ive p o s i t i o n  
had been l e f t  vacant  fol lowing t h e  merger 
of t w o  p rev ious ly  autonomous o rgan iza t ions .  
The lay committee charged wi th  t h e  respons i -  
b i l i t y  of s e l e c t i n g  a new execut ive  be- 
l i e v e d  t h a t  n e i t h e r  of t h e  incumbent 
directors of t h e  to-be-merged agencies  was 
s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  new p o s i t i o n .  T a c i t l y ,  
though r e l u c t a n t l y ,  t h i s  view was shared  
8 .  
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by t h e  incumbent execu t ives ,  and n e i t h e r  
saw f i t  t o  marshal h i s  resources  to make 
a "push" f o r  t h e  top  job. 
agreed t o  l eave  t h e  ma t t e r  of f i n a l  
execut ive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  ambiguous - not  
by a formal s ta tement  of procedure,  b u t  
by t h e  development by t h e  series of 
p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  f a c i l i t a t e d  informal  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of execut ive  func t ions .  
Each execut ive  assumed c e r t a i n  major 
t a s k s ,  and dec i s ions  a f f e c t i n ?  t h e  t o t a l  
o rganiza t ion  were evolved by j o in t  pro- 
cess and consensus. Had an occasion 
a r i s e n  i n  which a deadlock might have 
occurred, a f i n a l  de te rmina t ion  probably 
would have been made by t h e  l a y  p re s iden t  
of the organiza t ion .  However, t h e  process  
of exchange of view, and sea rch  f o r  agree-  
ment was such t h a t  t h i s  exigency w a s  
avoided, Fu r the r ,  it must be noted  t h a t  
each of t he  execut ives  had an important  
s t a k e  i n  "making t h e  arrangement work". 
Having avoided t h e  "moment of t r u t h "  t h a t  
would have requi red  t h e  choice of one over 
t he  o ther  o f  t h e  men f o r  t h e  top  p o s i t i o n ,  
Rather ,  they  
9 .  * -  
it now seemed incumbent upon them t o  
demonstrate t h a t  t h e  development of an 
' 'associate execut ive  d i r e c t o r "  s y s  tern 
involving both of them, could work 
e f feet  ive l y  . 
There are innumberable o t h e r  i n s t ances  i n  which 
ambiguity p l ays  a p o t e n t i a l l y  adapt ive  role.  . . t o  l i s t  
a few, in more-or-less s t a c c a t o  fashion:  
Case C: * 'whi le  dea l ing  wi th  s e n s i t i v e  s u b j e c t  
Gove rnmen t 
Research matter i t ' s  o f t e n  b e t t e r  t o  " j u s t  t a l k "  
about t h ings  , ( flambiguity"), without  p inning  
them down i n  w r i t i n g ,  ( "c la r i ty") .  (2 )  
A quote  by an execut ive  of a l a r g e  govern- 
ment agency who has r e c e n t l y  e n t e r e d  
government service from p r i v a t e  indus t ry :  
"They are always t r y i n g  t o  g e t  me t o  write 
t h i n g s  down and t o  give me a l o t  of forms. 
When I have t o ,  I do what ' s  necessary, but 
when I don't  want t o  be t i e d  down t o o  hard  
I r a t h e r  t e l l  people what I nant  them t o  do. 
Actua l ly ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  is  S e t t e r  f o r  
t h e  organiza t ion .  Sometimes, t h i n g s  
-
( 2 )  This is z re lat ive matter, o f  course.  The o o i n t  is  
t h a t  " ta lkqt  may leave wider  l a t i t u d e  and openness, 
while  " w r i t i n g  i t  down", though a l so  p o t e n t i a l l y  
ambiguous, does provide a s p e c i f i c  record a s . a  
b a s e l i n e  for future d e l i b e r a t i o n .  
change and i f  I wrote eve ry th ing  down, I ' d  
be i n  t roublet1.  
Case D: * ' t o  use t h e  t a l e n t s  of  a member of a board 
Willowend 
Savings and of d i r e c t o r s  i n  an a c t i v e  l i n e  c a p a c i t y ,  
Loan 
t h e  s p e c i f i c  working arrangement between 
t h e  board member and t h e  l i n e  managing 
o f f i c e r  i s  l e f t  undefined. ' 
Willowend Savings and Loan Assoc ia t ion  has 
on i t s  board a d i r e c t o r  who, although he 
was t r a i n e d  in a r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  f ie ld ,  
has  become an e x p e r t  i n  mu l t ip l e  dwell ing 
r e s i d e n t i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  The p r o f e s s i o n a l  
managing o f f i c e r  of t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  not  
t o o  happy about what he cons ide r s  t o  be 
" in te r fe rence"  by board members who, a f t e r  
a l l ,  "are supposed t o  e s t a b l i s h  p o l i c y  
without  g e t t i n g  i n t o  t h e  day-by-day oper-  
a t i o n  of  the  organizat ion".  Yet, he too 
realizes ( r e l u c t a n t l y )  t h a t  t h i s  d i r e c t o r ' s  
c a p a c i t i e s  would be u s e f u l  t o  the a t ta inment  
of  o rgan iza t iona l  goals .  To p l ace  t h e  
d i r e c t o r  on t h e  p a y r o l l  would be unacceptable  
i n  terms of t h e  accepted a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p .  To n e g l e c t  use of h i s  s k i l l s  would be 
11. 
organ iza t iona l ly  wasxeful.  On t h e  o t h e r  
hand, t o  leave  the s i t u a t i o n  ambiguous 
seems t o  be q u i t e  func t iona l :  t h e  
d i r e c t o r ' s  t a l e n t s  are u t i l i z e d  i n  something 
of a consu l t an t  ro l e ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  
s t r u c t u r e  i s  not  u p s e t ,  and t h e  amount of 
t h r e a t  inherent  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
t h e  d i r e c t o r  and the managing o f f i c e r  is  
he ld  wi th in  workable bounds. 
Case E: * 'the execut ive of an educa t iona l  u n i t  i n  a 
Bureau of Youth 
Educa t ion community we l fa re  i n s t i t u t i o n  claims t h a t  
he does not know who h i s  boss is. He is 
advised  t o  leave w e l l  enough a lone . '  
The fol lowing exce rp t  of conversat ion 
summarizes t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  
Educat ional  Executive: When I want a p o l i c y  
d e c i s i o n  on some t h i n g s ,  I don ' t  know wi th  
whom I should be t a l k i n g .  Is it supposed 
t o  be Z i d n e t z ,  or should I be t a l k i n g  with 
Sobart?  
Consultant:  Does t h i s  b o t h e r  you? 
Educat ional  Executive: I guessnot.  A t  l e a s t  
no t  usua l ly .  Bu t  I guess it can be a 
problem once i n  a w h i l e .  
. .  
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Consultant:  So why don ' t  you leave  mat te rs  a s  
they a r e ?  This  way you have a choice and 
you can t a l k  t o  whoever seems t o  be t3e 
most appropr ia te  guy t o  dea l  wi th .  
This, of course ,  r ep resen t s  an example of evo lu t ion  
of f u n c t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which f r equen t ly  
involve a degree of ambiguity - e s p e c i a l l y  as func t ions  
s h i f t  i n  response t o  changes i n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  
environment of t h e  organiza t ion .  
Ambiguity i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  t h e  eff luvium t h a t  makes 
p r o j e c t i v e  tests what they a r e .  Perhaps t h e r e  a r e  con- 
d i t i o n s  under which p r o j e c t i o n  of per sona l ly  d e s i r e d  
modes of  ope ra t ion  i n t o  a spec t s  of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  
a c t i n g  a s  though they were "Rorschach p la tes" ,  provides  
t h e  very f l e x i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  r e q u i r e s  t o  
absorb stress. V e r y  few, i f  any, s t r u c t u r a l l y  r i g i d  
organisms su rv ive  f o r  very long. Perhaps it becomes 
necessary a t  t h i s  t i m e  t o  carve  o u t  a s p e c i f i c  a r e a  
of inqu i ry  on organ iza t iona l  ambiguity,  wi th  t h e  mission 
t o  d e l i n e a t e  t h e  combinations of v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  charac-  
terize f u n c t i o n a l ,  dysfunct iona l  and optimum ambiguity 
types.  Methodologically,  t h e  problem may be approached 
by modi f ica t ions  of the  M u l t i - r e l a t i o n a l  Sociometr ic  
Survey (Tannenbaum, Weschler and i l a s sa r ik ,  1953, 1961) , 
and by t h e  employment o f  p r o j e c t i v e  dev ices ,  exp lo r ing  
how people r e a l l y  view t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of which they 
are a p a r t .  
